Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes of learning which change game models. Thus, strategic equilibrium gets linked to fixed-points of operations of repeated announcement of suitable epistemic statements.
1
Reaching equilibrium as an epistemic process
Inductive solution algorithms for games
Solving games often involves some stepwise algorithmic procedure. For instance, the well-known method of Backward Induction computes utility values at all nodes for all players in finite extensive games in a bottom up manner. Strategic games in matrix form also support recursive algorithms. Here is our running example in this paper:
Example 1 Iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies (SD ).
Consider the following matrix, with this legend for pairs: (A-value, E-value). Here is the instruction. First remove the dominated right-hand column (E's action c).
After that, the bottom row for A's action f has become strictly dominated, and then, In Section 3, we shall see which assertion drives these elimination steps. Analyzing the algorithm in this detailed manner involves both epistemic logic and dynamic action logic. In particular, in modern dynamic-epistemic logics (cf. Section 2), basic actions eliminating worlds from a model correspond to public announcements of some fact.
Exploring the analogy
This simple analogy between game solution algorithms and epistemic communication is the main idea of this paper. It has surprising repercussions worth pursuing, even though it is not a panacea for all problems of rational action. First, in Section 2, we explain the machinery of dynamic-epistemic logic, including the intriguing behaviour of repeated assertions. Section 3 has the epistemic game models with preference structure that we will work with, and we explore their logic. In Section 4, we define two major options for 'rationality' of players, and find a complete description of the finite models of interest. Then in Section 5, we analyze SD ¦ as repeated assertion of 'weak rationality', and also show how linking solution algorithms with announcement procedures suggests a variant algorithm driven by 'strong rationality' which matches Rationalizability. Section 6 analyzes the resulting framework for game analysis in general terms, and it proves that the solution zones for repeated announcement are definable in epistemic fixed-point logic. This links game-theoretic equilibrium theory with current fixed-point logics of computation. Finally, Section 7 points out further relevant features of the Muddy Children puzzle scenario, considering also epistemic procedures that revise players' beliefs. Section 8 discusses generalizations of our dynamic-epistemic style of analysis to extensive games and Backward Induction.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Standard epistemic logic in a nutshell
The language of standard epistemic logic has a propositional base with added modal at worlds, as we re-evaluate modalities in new smaller models. E.g., with
the Muddy Children of Example 2, true statements about ignorance became false eventually as worlds drop out. Thus, in the end, common knowledge was achieved.
Public announcement logic
Update can be studied in a dynamic epistemic logic using ideas from dynamic logic of programs to form mixed assertions allowing explicit reference to epistemic actions:
Definition 3 Logic of public announcement.
To all the formation rules of standard epistemic logic, we add a dynamic modality
[P!]'
after truthful public announcement of P, formula 
Other epistemic actions
Public announcement is the simplest form of communication. More sophisticated dynamic epistemic logics in the above style exist describing partial observation, hiding, misleading, and cheating. but they are not needed for the simple scenarios of this paper (Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998 , van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi 2005 .
Epistemic logic of strategic game forms
A dynamic epistemic analysis of game solution as model change presupposes a choice of static epistemic game models serving as the group information states. In this paper, we choose a very simple version -to keep the general proposal as simple as possible, and make the dynamics itself the key feature. preference relation P j among these possible outcomes of the game. In this paper, we work with a minimal epistemic super-structure over such games:
Epistemic game models
Definition 5 The full model over G is a multi-S5 epistemic structure M(G) whose worlds are all strategy profiles, and whose epistemic accessibility ~j for player j is defined as the equivalence relation of agreement of profiles in the j'th co-ordinate.
R
This stipulation means that players know their own action, but not that of the others.
Thus, models describe the moment of decision for players having all the relevant evidence. To model a more genuine process of deliberation, richer models would be needed -allowing for players' ignorance about other features as well. Such models exist in the literature, but we will stick with this simplest scenario here. Likewise, we ignore all issues having to do with probabilistic combinations of actions. On our minimalist view, we can read a game matrix directly as an epistemic model.
Example 4
Matrix game models.
The model for the matrix game in Example 1 looks as follows:
Here E's uncertainty relation ~E runs along columns, because E knows his own action, but not that of A. The uncertainty relation of A runs among the rows. Theorem 4 Every multi-S5 model has a bisimulation with a general game model.
Corollary 1
The complete logic of general game models is just multi-S5. 
Epistemic logic of game models
Best response and Nash equilibria
To talk about solutions and equilibria we need some further structure in game models, in particular, some atomic assertions that reflect the preferences underneath. b Stated in this way, best response is an absolute property whose conjunction runs over all actions in the original given game G -whether these occur in the model M or not.
Thus, B j is an atomic proposition letter, which keeps its value when models change.
Example 5
Expanded game models.
Well-known games provide simple examples of the epistemic models of interest here.
Consider Battle of the Sexes with its two Nash equilibria. The abbreviated diagram to the right has best-response atomic propositions at worlds where they are true:
Next, our running Example 1 yields a full epistemic game model with 9 worlds:
As for the distribution of the B j -atoms, by the above definition, every column in a full game model must have at least one occurrence of B A , and every row one of B E .
b
Inside these models, more complex epistemic assertions can also be evaluated. e A fortiori, then, common knowledge of rationality in its most obvious sense is often false throughout the full model of a game, even one with a unique Nash equilibrium.
With this enriched language, the logic of game models becomes more interesting.
Example 6
Valid game laws involving best response.
The following principle holds in all full game models: <E>B A f <A>B E . It expresses the final observation of Example 5. We will see further valid principles later on.
e
But there are also alternative logical languages for game models. In particular, the above word 'best' is context-dependent. A natural relative version of best response in a general game model M looks only at the strategy profiles available inside M. After all, in that model players know that these are the only action patterns that will occur.
Definition 8
Relative best response.
The relative best response proposition B * j in a general game model M is true at only those strategy profiles where j's action is a best response to that of her opponent when the comparison set is all alternative strategy profiles in M.
e With B * j , best profiles for j may change as the model changes. For instance, in a oneworld model for a game, the single profile is relatively best for all players, though it may be absolutely best for none. The relative version has independent interest:
Remark 2
Relative best response and implicit knowledge.
Relative best response may be interpreted in epistemic terms. With two players, it says the other player knows that j's current action is at most as good for j as j's action at Finally, the connection: absolute-best implies relative-best, but not vice versa.
Example 7
All models have relative best positions.
To see the difference between the two notions, compare the two models
Rationality assertions
Rationality is playing one's best response given what one knows or believes. But our models support distinctions here, such as absolute versus relative best. Moreover, we found that even if players in fact play their best action, they need not know that they are doing so. So, if rationality is to be a self-reflective property, what can they know?
7 The original version of this paper (van Benthem 2002C) has a richer language for game models with preference modalities, nominals for specific worlds, a universal modality over worlds, and distributed group knowledge. These modal gadgets yield formulas like K A This issue is also important in our epistemic conversation scenarios for game solution (Sections 2, 5). Normally, we let players only say things which they know to be true.
Weak Rationality
Players may not know that their action is best, even if it is -but they can know that there is no alternative action which they know to be better. In short, 'they are no fools'.
Definition 9 Weak Rationality.
Weak Rationality at world r in a model M is the assertion that, for each available alternative action, j thinks the current one may be at least as good 
Strong rationality
Weak Rationality is a logical conjunction of epistemic possibility operators: & <j>.
A stronger form of rationality assertion would invert this order, expressing that players think that their actual action may be best. In a slogan, instead of merely 'being no fool', they can now reasonably 'hope they are being clever'.
Definition 10 Strong Rationality.
Strong rationality for j at a world in a model M is the assertion that j thinks that her current action may be at least as good as all others:
current action is at least as good for j as a'
This time we use the absolute index set running over all action profiles in the game.
This means that the assertion can be written equivalently as the modal formula <j>B j.
Strong Rationality for the whole group of players is the conjunction & j SR j .
By the S5-law <j> K j <j> , SR j is something that players j will know if true.
Thus, it behaves like WR j . Moreover, we have this comparison:
Proposition 3 SR j implies WR j , but not vice versa.
Proof Consider the following game model, with B-atoms indicated:
No column or row dominates any other, and WR j holds throughout for both players.
But SR E holds only in the two left-most columns. For it rejects actions which are never best, even though there need not be one alternative which is better over-all. 
Remark 3
Infinite game models.
On infinite game models, SR-loops need not occur. Consider a grid of the form NxN:
Suppose that the best-response pattern runs diagonally as follows:
Then, every sequence B E ~A B A ~E B E ~A B A … must break off at the top.
But now, we turn to the dynamic epistemic role of these assertions.
9 5 Iterated announcement of rationality and game solution
Virtual conversation scenarios
Here is our proposed scenario behind an iterative solution algorithm. We are at some generic assertions that can be formulated in the epistemic language of best response and rationality, without names of concrete actions. And Section 4 supplied these.
Weak rationality and iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies
Our first result recasts the usual characterizations of SD as follows.
Theorem 7
The following are equivalent for worlds s in full game models M(G): 
The general program
Theorem 8 is mathematically elementary -and conceptually, it largely restates what we already knew. But the more general point is the style of update analysis as such.
We can now match games and epistemic logic in two directions.
From games to logic Given some algorithm defining a solution concept, we can try to find epistemic actions driving its dynamics.
This was the direction of thought illustrated by our analysis of the SD algorithm.
But there is also a reverse direction:
From logic to games Any type of epistemic assertion defines an iterated solution process which may have independent interest.
In principle, this suggests a general traffic between game theory and logic, going beyond the existing batch of epistemic characterization results which take the game-theoretic solution repertoire as given. Our next illustration shows this potentialthough in the end, it turns out to match an existing game-theoretic notion after all.
Another scenario: announcing strong rationality
Instead of WR, we can also announce Strong Rationality in the preceding scenario.
This gives a new game-theoretic solution procedure, whose behaviour can differ.
Example 8
Iterated announcement of SR.
Our running example gives exactly the same model sequence as with SD :
In this particular sequence, a one-world Nash equilibrium model is reached at the end.
But SR differs from WR in this modification of our running example:
WR does not remove any rows or columns, whereas SR removes the top row as well as the right-hand column of this game model.
In general, like WR, iterated announcement of SR can get stuck in cycles.
Example 9 Ending in SR-loops.
In this model, successive announcement of SR gets stuck in a 4-cycle:
Here is what is going on in this update sequence. An individual announcement that j is strongly rational leaves only states s where SR j is true, making j's rationality common knowledge. But this announcement may eliminate worlds from the model, invalidating SR k at s for other players k, as their existential modalities now lack a witness. For the same reason, announcements of everyone's rationality need not result in common knowledge of joint rationality. Thus, repeated announcement of SR makes sense.
Proposition 4
Strong Rationality is self-fulfilling on finite full game models.
Proof Every finite game model has an SR loop (Theorem 7). Worlds in such loops
keep satisfying Strong Rationality, and are never eliminated. In finite models, the procedure stops when all worlds have ~E and ~A successors on such loops, and Strong
Rationality for the whole group has become common knowledge.
In particular, Nash equilibria present in the game survive into the fixed-point, being
SR-loops of length 0. But even when these exist, we cannot hope to get just these, as
This gets stuck at once in its initial SR-loop pattern, as <E>B E < A>B A is true everywhere: and repeated announcement of SR has no effect at all.
But when all is said and done, we have described an existing game-theoretic solution method once more! Iterated announcement of SR amounts to successive removal of actions that are never a best response given the current set of available outcomes. But this procedure is precisely Pearce's game-theoretic algorithm of Rationalizability. 
10
Comparing iterated WR and SR
Theorem 8
For any epistemic model M, #(SR, M) #(WR, M).
This is not obvious, and will only be shown using fixed-point techniques in Section 6, which develops the logic of epistemic game models in further detail. Again within standard game theory, Pearce has shown that solution procedures based on removing dominated strategies and procedures based on rationalizability yield the same results in suitably rich game models including mixed strategies. Looking at the logical form of the corresponding assertions WR and SR, our guess is that this is like validating logical quantifier switches in compact, or otherwise 'completed' models. 10 In line with Apt 2005, we note that there are really two options here. Our approach uses a notion of 'best' referring to all actions available in the original model, as codified in our proposition letters. In addition, there is the relative version of 'best response' mentioned in Section 3.3, whose use in iterated announcement of SR would rather correspond to Bernheim's version of the Rationalizability algorithm.
Other rational things to say
SR is just one new rationality assertion that can drive a game solution algorithm. Many variants are possible in the light of Section 4. For instance, let the initial game model have Nash equilibria, and suppose that players have decided on one. The best they can know then in the full game model is that they are possibly in such an equilibrium.
In this case, we can keep announcing something stronger than SR, viz.
<E> NE <A> NE Equilibrium Announcement
By the same reasoning as for SR, this is self-fulfilling, and its announcement limit leaves all Nash equilibria plus all worlds which are both ~E and ~A related to one.
We conclude with an excursion about possible maximal communication (Section 2.5).
Once generic rationality statements are exhausted, there may still be ad-hoc things to say, that zoom in further on the actual world, if players communicate directly.
Example 11 Getting a bit further.
Consider the following full game model with two different SR-loops, and with the assertion SR true everywhere. The actual world is at the top left, representing some (admittedly suboptimal) pair of decisions for the two players: is an epistemic bisimulation between them, in the sense of Definition 1, linking all four points to the single one. The same notion tells us when further announcements have no effect. This shows particularly clearly with some basic SR-loops, which have already reached the maximal communicative core in the sense of Section 2.5.
Example 12 Bisimulation contractions of game models.
Consider the two loops occurring in Example 11. The first has two Nash equilibria:
There is an obvious bisimulation between this model and the following one: 
But the latter stronger statement has the same announcement limit as SR E h SR A .
Even so, a dynamic epistemic approach looks at local effects of sequential assertions, and the price for this is order-dependence, and other tricky phenomena known from imperative programming. For skeptics, this will be an argument against the approach as such. For fans of dynamics, it just reflects the well-known fact that, in communication and social action generally, matters of procedure crucially affect outcomes.
6
Logical background: from epistemic dynamics to fixed-point logic
Issues in dynamic epistemic logic
Our conversation scenario raises many general issues of dynamic epistemic logic.
Some of these are entirely standard ones of axiomatization. E.g., with a suitable language including best response, preference comparisons, and rationality assertions, standard epistemic logics of game models encode much of the reasoning in this paper.
An example is the existence of SR-loops in full game models in Theorem 7. This can be expressed in epistemic fixed-point logic, as shown in this Section, and hence the complete logic of game models in such a language would be worth determining.
In addition to axiomatization, there are model-theoretic issues. A well-known open question in dynamic epistemic logic is the 'Learning Problem' (van Benthem 2002B).
Some formulas, when announced in a model, always become common knowledge.
A typical example are atomic facts, witness the validity of the dynamic-epistemic
Other formulas, when announced, make their own falsity common knowledge. The Moore-style assertion "p, but you don't know it" is a good example:
. Yet other formulas make themselves common knowledge only after a finite number of repeated announcements. Or they have no uniformity at all, but become true or false depending on the current model.
Question
Exactly which syntactic forms of assertion
There are obvious connections with the self-fulfilling formulas providing a more general perspective on our analysis so far.
Equilibria and fixed point logic
To motivate our next step, here is a different take on the original SDn algorithm. The original game model itself need not shrink, but we compute a new property of its worlds in approximation stages, starting with the whole domain, and shrinking this until no further change occurs. Such a top-down procedure is like computation of a greatest fixed point for some set operator on a domain. Other solution algorithms, such as backward induction, compute smallest fixed points with a bottom up procedure.
Either way, game solution and equilibrium has to do with fixed points! Fixed-point operators can be added to various logical languages, such as standard firstorder logic (Moschovakis 1974) . In the present setting, we use an epistemic version of the modal o -calculus (Stirling 1999) . Its semantics works as follows. t This is the proper setting for our scenarios in Section 5. In particular, the SR-limit can be defined as a greatest fixed-point in an epistemic u -calculus:
Theorem 9
The stable set of worlds for repeated announcement of SR is defined inside the full game model by
Proof The set of non-eliminated worlds in the SR procedure has the required closure properties, and so it is included in the greatest fixed-point. And conversely, no world in the greatest fixed-point can ever be eliminated by an announcement of SR.
x
The equilibrium character shows as follows in this format. The greatest-fixed-point
) defines the largest set P from which both agents can see a position which is best for them, and which is again in this very set P.
More precisely, the top-down approximation sequence for any formula There is a clear correspondence between these stages and elimination rounds in game matrices. Announcing Weak Rationality can be analyzed in a similar fashion.
General announcement limits are inflationary fixed points
But there is more to iterated announcement. Recall the definition of the announcement limit #(y , M) in Section 5. It arose by continued application of the following function:
Definition 12
Set operator for public announcement.
The function computing the next set for iterated announcement of Theorem 10 The iterated announcement limit is an inflationary fixed point.
Proof Take any ~ , and relativize it to a fresh proposition letter p, yielding p
In the latter formula, p need not occur positively (it becomes negative, e.g., when relativizing positive universal box modalities), and hence a fixed-point operator of the -calculus sort is forbidden. An example is
Now the Relativization Lemma for logical languages can be applied to work with all of M. Let P be the denotation of the proposition letter p in M. Then for all s in P: 
Monotone fixed points after all
Theorem 10 said that iterated announcement of SR works via an ordinary greatest fixed-point operator, definable in the epistemic -calculus. The reason is that the update function F M, SR (X) is indeed monotone for set inclusion. This has to do with the special syntactic form of SR, and its model-theoretic preservation behaviour:
Proof Existential modal formulas are built with only existential modalities, literals, conjunction and disjunction. In particular, no universal knowledge modalities occur.
With this special syntax, the above relativization ( p has only positive occurrences of p, so F * is monotone, with an ordinary greatest fixed point computation.
Existential announcements occur elsewhere, too. Note that this is also the format of the ignorance announcements in the earlier example of the Muddy Children.
Theorem 11 has several applications. The first of these is the earlier Theorem 9 comparing the update sequences for Weak and Strong Rationality:
Conversely, two steps of simultaneous SR announcement also produce an existential formula implying that for SR E ; SR A . Hence we also have the opposite inclusion.
This order independence failed for the case of the Muddy Children. The reason is that its driving assertion of ignorance, though existential, involves a negation. Therefore, the single epistemic formula for sequential announcement of ignorance acquires a universal modality. So, its update map is not monotonic, and our argument collapses.
Our final application of Theorem 12 is of a more general logical nature.
Corollary 4 Dynamic epistemic logic with #( ) added for existential i s decidable.
Proof Announcement limits for existential epistemic formulas arise via monotone operators. So they are definable in the epistemic -calculus, which is decidable.
In particular, reasoning about Strong Rationality or Muddy Children stays simple.
Greatest fixed points in game generally
The above suggests a preference for greatest fixed-points in game analysis. Indeed, even bottom-up backward induction can be recast as a top down greatest fixed point procedure. E.g., Zermelo's well-known theorem on determinacy for finite zero-sum two-player games, the node colouring algorithm essentially amounts to evaluating a modal fixed point formula. Van Benthem 2002A takes a -version for the bottom up algorithm, but here is a greatest fixed-point version which works just as well:
This will colour every node as a win for player E first -but then, using the universal set as a first approximation, stage by stage, the right colours for A will appear. More generally, strategies seem like never-ending resources like our doctors, which can be tapped in case of need, and then return to their original state. This fits well with the recursive character of greatest fixed-points as explained earlier. Richer models: worries, external sources, beliefs
Our proposal makes game solution a process of virtual communication of rationality assertions, resulting in epistemic equilibrium. Of the many possible statements driving this, we have looked only at weak and strong rationality. But the scenario admits of many more variations, some of them already exemplified in Section 1.
Muddy Children revisited
The initial information models for Muddy Children are cubes of 3-vectors, which look like full game models. But the self-defeating ignorance assertions driving the puzzle suggest an alternative 'self-defeating' scenario for games, reaching solution zones by repeatedly announcing, not players' rationality, but rather their worries that nonoptimal outcomes are still a live option. In fact, the story of the Muddy Children as it stands is such a scenario, with actions 'dirty', 'clean'. Children keep saying "my action Some equilibria may be reached only after external information has removed some strategy profiles, breaking the symmetry of the SR-loops of Section 8:
The initial model is an SR-loop, and nothing gets eliminated by announcing SR. But after an initial announcement that, say, the bottom-left world is not a possible outcome, updates take the resulting 3-world model to its single Nash equilibrium.
Every equilibrium world or solution zone can be obtained in this way, if definable in our language. The art is to find plausible external announcements which can set the virtual conversation going, or intervene at intermediate stages.
Changing beliefs and plausibility
The epistemic game models (M, s) of Section 3 with just relations ~j may seem naive. The literature often has worlds including complete strategy profiles § as before, with some added game node s. But sometimes, this seems overly structured, and we can stay closer to the game tree of an extensive game, interpreting some standard branching-temporal language (cf. van Benthem 2002D, van Benthem, van Otterloo & Royu 2005 . At nodes of the tree, players still see a set of possible histories continuing the one so far. Further information may lead them to rule out branches from this set.
Backward Induction analyzed
First, consider a very simple standard case of the procedure.
Example 15 Backward Induction.
Here are the successive steps computing node values in a simple case: This is a bottom-up computation procedure for node values. But we can also recast its steps as an elimination procedure for branches, driven by iterated announcement of an analogue of the earlier rationality principles of Section 4. Here is one version of this:
Definition 13
Momentaneous Rationality.
The assertion of momentaneous rationality MR says that at every stage of a branch in the current model, the player whose turn it is, has not selected a move whose available continuations all end worse for her than all those after some other possible move.
¨
A nnouncing MR removes at least those histories from the game tree which would be deleted by one backward induction step. Moreover, repeated announcement makes sense, as a smaller bundle of possible future histories may trigger new eliminations.
Sometimes, the MR process may go faster than backward induction. E.g., in Example 16, both rightmost branches would be eliminated straightaway by announcing MR if the value of the right end node (2, 0) had been (1/2, 0). But the end result is the same:
Proposition 5 On finite extensive game trees, iterated announcement of MR arrives exactly at the Backward Induction solution.
Again, this announcement scenario also suggests alternative solution procedures.
For instance, a more co-operative scenario might involve an assertion of Conclusion Dynamic intuitions concerning activities of deliberation and communication lie behind much of epistemic logic and related themes in game theory -though they are often left implicit. Now, in physics, an equilibrium is only intelligible if we also give an explicit dynamic account of the forces leading to it. Likewise, epistemic equilibrium is best understood with an explicit logical account of the actions leading to it. For this purpose, we used update scenarios for scenarios of virtual communication, in a dynamic epistemic logic for changing game models. This new stance also fits better with our intuitive term rationality. One sometimes talks about rational outcomes, which satisfy some sort of harmony between utilities and expectations. But the more fundamental notion may be that of rational agents performing rational actions. Taken in the latter sense, our rationality is located precisely in the procedure being followed.
Summarizing our main technical findings, solving a game involves dynamic epistemic procedures which are of interest per se, and game-theoretic equilibria are then greatest fixed points of such procedures. This analogy suggests a general study of game solution concepts in dynamic epistemic logic, instead of just separate epistemic characterization theorems. Sections 5, 6 identified a number of model-theoretic results on dynamic epistemic logics which show there is content to such a connection. In particular, game-theoretic equilibrium got linked to computational fixed-point logics,
which have a sophisticated theory of their own that may be useful here. But mainly, we hope our scenarios are just fun to explore, extend, and generally: play with! about the future course of the game. To do justice to this, we would need a more complex dynamicepistemic-temporal logic. Also, more complex global hypotheses about behaviour than MR or CR (say, 'you are a finite automaton') take us back to full-fledged strategy-profile worlds after all. Van Benthem 2002D has further discussion and a richer temporal framework for dealing with such scenarios.
Finally, our analysis has obvious limitations. The models are crude, and cannot make sophisticated epistemic distinctions. Moreover, we have ignored the role of probability and mixed strategies throughout. Given all this, we certainly do not claim that bringing in explicit epistemic dynamics is a miracle cure for the known cracks in the foundations of game theory. But it does add a new way of looking at things, as well as one more sample of promising contacts between games, logic, and computation.
